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We present a simple classroom principal-agent experiment that can effectively be used as a 
teaching device to introduce important concepts of organizational economics and contracting. 
In a first part, students take the role of a principal and design a contract that consists of a fixed 
payment and an incentive component. In the second part, students take the role of agents and 
decide on an effort level. The experiment can be used to introduce students to the concepts of 
efficiency,  incentive  compatibility,  outside  options  and  participation  constraints,  the  Coase 
theorem, and fairness and reciprocity in contracting.    
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1. Introduction 
The  principal-agent  framework  is  arguably  the  most  important  common  paradigm  in 
courses  on  organizational  economics,  personnel  economics,  and  contract  theory  taught  in 
economics departments and business schools.  This is documented, e.g., in the textbooks by 
Milgrom and Roberts (1992), Lazear (1998), Baron and Kreps (1999) and Brickley, Smith and 
Zimmerman (2001) which appear on many syllabi of organizational economics courses. They 
all devote considerable space to the issue of contracting and the principal-agent paradigm. In 
the preface to their textbook Brickley et al. (2001) note: “A quiet revolution is occurring within 
business schools. (…) Armed with powerful theories and access to unprecedented data, we now 
have  a  rich  set  of  managerial  insights  to  teach  about  the  workings  of  organizations  and 
markets.” One of these insights is certainly that work incentives are an important management 
issue and that the principal-agent framework is very useful for discussing these issues.  
In this paper we present a simple classroom experiment on a two-person principal agent 
game  that  we  have  found  very  effective  in  introducing  and  illustrating  the  principal-agent 
framework and other important concepts of organizational economics and contracting.
1 First, 
the students take the role of a principal who may design a contract that is offered to an agent. 
Second,  the  students  take  the  role  of  an  agent  who  receives  a  contract  and  decides  upon 
individual effort. 
To motivate the principal’s problem the students are asked to imagine being the “owner” 
of a company who lacks the expertise to run it him- or herself. Therefore an “expert” needs to 
be hired. The offered contract can specify two instruments of payment: A fixed payment or a 
return share or both. The fixed payment can be either positive or negative (it has to be between 
+700 and –700). If the fixed payment is positive, this is tantamount to a salary for the expert.  If 
the fixed payment is negative, this is tantamount to a payment of the expert to the owner. The 
return share may be set between 0 and 100 percent (in multiples of 10 percent). It specifies the 
share of the return which the expert can pocket for him- or herself.  For instance, if the return 
share is 100 percent, the expert will receive all of the return.  Thus, contract design allows for a 
variety of contracts including pure fixed wage contracts and high powered incentive contracts. 
                                                 
1 For those who want to conduct this experiment in a computerized laboratory, we also provide a program (called 
“design_a_contract.ztt”) that runs under the experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher 1999). z-Tree is a popular 
and easy to use toolbox for economic experiments. z-Tree does not require any programming skills. It is freely 
available (see http://www.iew.unizh.ch/ztree/index.php). z-Tree has to be installed first before our program can be 
used. Details can be found in Fischbacher (1999). z-Tree runs under Windows NT, 2000, and XP (but not under 
Windows 98). The program “design_a_contract.ztt” is available from the authors upon request.   3 
In the second part of the experiment, all students decide in the role of the expert.  They 
first have to decide whether they accept or reject the contract they are confronted with (we 
explain below how this is done).  If the contract is rejected, the expert earns an outside wage of 
100 while the owner earns nothing.  If the expert has decided to accept the contract, he or she 
has to choose a costly effort level which determines the company’s return. The return is split 
between owner and expert according to the terms of the contract; the expert has to bear the cost 
of effort. 
There are ten effort levels (from 1 to 10) and costs are increasing and convex in the effort 
level. Efficiency requires that the expert chooses the highest effort level but, under standard 
assumptions of rationality and selfishness, the expert will choose the lowest effort level.  Thus, 
to induce an opportunistic expert to exert the highest effort level, the owner has to give the 
expert a sufficiently large share of the return.  Specifically, in the subgame perfect solution, if 
the owner him- or herself is rational and selfish, he will offer a return share of 100 percent and 
ask for the whole generated surplus minus 100 (the expert’s outside wage).
2   
This teaching experiment is very simple and easy to implement.  The role change in the 
two parts of the experiment simplifies procedures considerably, because the instructor does not 
have to match principals and agents (who are idle until their principal has reached a decision).  
Moreover, the design allows gathering data from all students in both roles, which also often 
results in interesting behavioral patterns and subsequent discussions. 
In addition to introducing students to the principal-agent framework this simple game 
allows  conveying  the  following  theoretically  and  practically  important  concepts:  (i)  post-
contractual opportunism (ii) efficiency, (iii) incentive compatibility, (iv) outside options and 
the  “participation  constraint”,  (v)  the  Coase  theorem  and  (vi)  fairness  and  reciprocity  in 
contracting.  The game can also be used to illustrate important principles of optimal behavior 
(like determining the optimal effort level by using a “marginal cost equals marginal benefit” 
analysis), the concept of the disutility of effort and when we need incentives, the necessity and 
difficulty of anticipating the behavioral reactions to the terms set in a contract, and recent 
insights from behavioral economics research.   
 
                                                 
2 With our parameters return shares of 80 to 100 percent induce efficiency.  Offering 100 percent is the trembling-
hand perfect solution. See Anderhub et al. (2002).    4 
2. Procedures 
The experiment consists of two parts.  In the first part, all students act in the role of the 
principal.  In the second part, which we do not announce beforehand, all students decide in the 
role of the agent. Class size does not matter much for this experiment. We ran the experiment 
with classes of 20 to 40 students.  
The experiment does not need much preparation.  The instructor only needs to copy (i) 
the instructions, (ii) the contract design sheet of the principal and (iii) the effort decision sheet 
of the agent.  We found it useful to put the instructions on one piece of paper, and the contract 
design sheet and the effort decision sheet of the agent on two separate sheets of paper.  It is also 
helpful  to  use  different  colors  for  the  three  sheets.  Also  prepare  transparencies  of  the 
instructions
3 and a results sheet on a transparency that will be helpful after the experiment in 
communicating the results and stimulating the discussion.  The reader will find a copy of all 
materials that we use in the appendix of this paper.   
The experiment is implemented as follows.  First, distribute the instructions to all students 
and ask them to  read them carefully and silently. Students will need 5-7 minutes for this. 
Second, after students have read the instructions, summarize the rules of the game by using the 
prepared transparencies and the overhead projector.  After you have summarized the rules, take 
questions.  Third, ask the students to design their contracts now.  It is, of course, important that 
students do not talk to each other and make their choices privately.  Students will typically 
need  5-7  minutes  for  designing  their  contracts.    Fourth,  after  students  have  designed  their 
contracts, collect all sheets, and announce that now all sheets will be shuffled and redistributed. 
Explain that all students will now act in the role of the expert.  After you have shuffled the 
decision sheets, distribute them along with the decision sheet of the agent.  Before students take 
the decisions, summarize the rules for the agents with the help of a transparency.  Emphasize 
that the agents have to insert the contract they have received into their decision sheets.  Then 
students will need about 3-5 minutes to reach their decision.  The whole experiment will need 
about 30 minutes, including distributing and recollecting decision sheets.  Ask a student to 
assist you, if you have large classes.   
 
                                                 
3 The instructions we use are written in Microsoft Word in font size 20 pt, and comprise three pages in the original 
format.  This has the following two advantages: First, you can print the instructions on one piece of paper by using 
the  option  of  printing  four  pages  on  one  page.    Second,  you  can  also  print  the  same  set  of  instructions  on 
transparencies, which are very helpful in summarizing the basic rules.       5 
3. Classroom Discussion 
After you have collected the agent’s decision sheets, ask one or two students to list them 
on the prepared transparencies (see appendix).  We found it useful to present the results in two 
ways.    The  first  results  sheet  (“Offered  contracts  and  effort  levels”)  just  lists  the  offered 
contracts and the chosen effort levels.  The second results sheet (“Optimal effort choice?”) 
summarizes  the  actual  effort  choices  according  to  the  best  reply  effort  levels.    These 
transparencies are very helpful in the formal part of the discussion (see below).   
We  always  find  it  useful  to  kick  off  the  discussion  informally.    That  is,  while  your 
assistant prepares the results, ask the students for their opinion on this experiment.  Usually 
students are happy to give their impressions.  Then proceed to ask questions like: “How did 
you come up with a contract in the first part?”  “What kind of considerations did you have in 
mind?”  “In the second part, when you were an expert, how did you decide?”  Most likely, this 
part of the discussion will reveal that the students quickly got the rules, but found it very tricky 
to think about an optimal contract design.  Naturally, they find it easier to decide on the effort 
level than on the contract.  By the time you have collected some statements, your assistant will 
be ready with the results and students will be very curious to learn about them.  We first put up 
the results sheet with the offered contracts.  
A typical result is that many principals ask for a return share of 50 percent and pay a 
positive fixed wage.  About 10 to 20 percent of the contracts, usually, specify return shares 
larger than 80 percent, and very few contracts offer a fixed wage only.  Thus, people recognize 
the necessity to set incentives by offering a return share.  There are a few contracts that ask for 
a negative fixed payment (typically those that offered a return share of 100%).  When students 
are asked why they did not stipulate a negative fixed wage, and offered only 50 percent as a 
return  share,  many  arguments  were  reminiscent  of  the  endowment  effect  (see  Kahneman, 
Knetsch and Thaler 1991): They do not want to part ownership, because they feel entitled to 
ownership.   
When students decide in the role of the expert (i.e., the agent), they often reject contracts 
(between 30 – 40 percent).  Stated reasons for rejections often relate to the unfairness of the 
contract.  The average effort level is usually between 5 and 6.   
Putting  up  the  results  will  satisfy  the  students’  curiosity  and  further  stimulate  the 
discussion. Some of them will say that they did not think about the expert’s likely effort level 
when they decided about the contract.  Rather, they just thought about what in their opinion a 
reasonable  contract  looks  like.    Put  differently,  they  did  not  think  strategically.    Others,   6 
however, thought about the expert’s likely reaction and designed their contract accordingly.  In 
the role of the expert they reject contracts they view as unfair and, if they accept the contract, 
they use a diversity of rules to decide on the effort level.   
After this informal discussion that we always found to be quite lively, the  ground is 
prepared for a more formal discussion.  Students are eager to learn about the “correct” solution 
to this problem.  A good starting point is putting up a graphical depiction of the return and cost 
schedule (Figure 1).   
Figure 1 makes clear that the pie is largest at the effort level 10.  The question is how to 
implement  effort  level  10.    Before  embarking  on  this  question,  it  is  useful  to  discuss  the 
schedules first.  While students quickly get the idea of an increasing return, some of them do 
not have an immediate intuition of the cost schedule being convex.  It can be used to drive the 
idea  home  that  incentive  theory  is  about  any  productive  activity  that  agents  don’t  want  to 
pursue at the margin (for instance, working long hours and thereby forgoing the opportunity to 
watch a movie or to spend the evening with one’s spouse).  If you have time, you can also use 
this to discuss theories of work motivation (working for money vs. job satisfaction and self-
fulfillment, etc.). 




























The next step in the discussion is the question how to achieve effort level 10.  Before 
going  into  the  derivation  of  the  optimal  result,  it  is  useful  to  start  with  a  discussion  of 
incomplete contracts.  If the principal could enforce a contract that stipulates a particular effort 
level, there would not be any need for an incentive contract.  As Milgrom and Roberts (1992)   7 
put it (p. 127): “Motivation problems arise only because some plans cannot be described in a 
complete, enforceable contract.”   
The  search  for  the  optimal  contract  in  this  experiment  starts  with  an  argument  on 
backward induction.  The principal has to think about the agent’s reaction to a contract.  By 
assuming that the agent wants to maximize his or her monetary income, we can start with the 
analysis.  Students usually remember the “marginal benefit equals marginal cost” principle of 
optimal choice.  In this setup, the total marginal return from effort is constant and equals 70. 
The  fixed  payment  is  independent  of  the  effort  level  and  therefore  does  not  influence  the 
marginal benefit.  The marginal benefit that belongs to the agent is determined by the return 
share.  If the return share is zero, the marginal return for the agent is zero, but the marginal cost 
is always positive.  Thus, an optimizing agent will always “shirk”, i.e., work at the lowest effort 
level in this case. Incentives are needed to prevent this “post-contractual opportunism”.  The 
opposite case occurs when the return share is 100 percent.  In this case the agent can pocket the 
whole return.  A comparison of marginal cost and benefit quickly reveals that marginal cost are 
at most 50, but the marginal return is always 70.  Thus, an agent who enjoys the full fruits of 
his or her labor has an incentive to work at the highest effort level.  At this point students will 
probably realize that already a return share of 80 percent suffices to induce full effort of an 
optimizing agent.   
Figure 2 conveys the logic of the “incentive compatibility constraint” for various return 
shares.  The analysis reveals that only five effort levels can be optimal – levels 1, 4, 6, 8 and 
10.
4  The main message of this argument is that economic theory predicts a positive correlation 
between return share and effort level.   
 
                                                 
4 Effort level 1 is optimal for return shares 0, 10 and 20 percent; effort level 4 is optimal for return shares of 30 
and 40 percent; effort level 6 is best for the return share of 50 percent; level 8 is a best response for the return 
shares of 60 and 70 percent; and return shares larger than 70 percent will induce the highest level.    8 




















































1, 4, 6, 8, 10
Marginal returns:
 
A principal who understands the problem of post-contractual opportunism and the logic 
of the incentive compatibility constraint, will therefore offer a contract that gives the agent at 
least a return share of  80 percent.   Since this  return share induces an optimizing agent to 
provide the largest effort, the surplus will be maximized and amount to 400 (see Figure 1).  
Provided the agent is a money maximizer, the principal will therefore ask for a fixed payment 
of –299.  The agent, who earns 100 if he or she rejects the contract, therefore enjoys a net 
earning of one money unit and will consequently accept the contract.   
Of course, the data do not conform to this prediction.  Agents, who receive a contract they 
view  as  unfair,  are  likely  to  reject  it.    The  results  are  very  similar  as  in  the  well-known 
ultimatum  game.
5    Thus,  you  can  drive  home  the  point  that  the  relevant  “participation 
constraint” of the agent is not just his or her outside option, but what the agent is willing to 
accept.  
The effort choices of accepted contracts conform by and large to economic theory.  The 
correlation between return share and actual effort level is usually highly significantly positive.  
This message can be effectively conveyed by using the second results sheet (“Optimal effort 
choice?”).  Students are usually quite impressed.  
This theoretical discussion, combined with the results, can be very helpful to the students 
for getting the economic logic right.  You can discuss the theoretical properties of fixed and 
variable  payments,  the  importance  of  outside  options,  and  the  participation  and  incentive 
                                                 
5 The survey papers by Camerer and Thaler (1995) and Güth (1995) summarize important results on the ultimatum 
game. See also Camerer (2003, Chap. 2) for a comprehensive treatment.     9 
compatibility constraints. However,  you can also discuss the relevance of fair sharing, and 
reciprocity in contracting.  As in many other experiments we usually observe some students 
who reject unfair contracts or choose a suboptimal effort level for reciprocal reasons.  Thus, if 
you have time, you can also briefly discuss recent advances in behavioral economics research 
that has documented the importance of fairness and reciprocity in principal-agent games and 
beyond.
6 
This experiment can also be used to discuss the economic concept of efficiency.  Students 
easily  see  where  the  pie  is  maximized.    They  also  understand  that  if  the  pie  is  not  yet 
maximized there are arrangements where a least one party can be made better off, without 
making  the  other  one  worse  off.    From  the  concept  of  efficiency  it  is  a  small  step  to  the 
“efficiency principle”, “value maximization” and the “Coase theorem” as discussed, e.g., by 
Milgrom and Roberts (1992, Chap. 2).  We therefore usually assign Chap. 2 in Milgrom and 
Roberts (1992) as compulsory reading and ask the students in a homework assignment to relate 
these concepts to the classroom experiment.   
 
4. Further Reading 
Ortmann and Colander (1997) also describe a principal-agent game used as a teaching 
device.  Their game is a version of the prisoner’s dilemma and can be used to illustrate the 
issue of moral hazard.  Douglas (1997) proposes a simple analytical approach of teaching the 
principal-agent problem. Holt (1999) provides a general discussion of classroom experiments 
and a host of examples.  
The experimental design of the present teaching experiment is inspired by research papers 
we were involved in (Anderhub, Gächter and Königstein 2002; Güth, Klose, Königstein and 
Schwalbach 1998; Königstein 2001).  See Anderhub et al. (2002) for  references to further 
principal-agent experiments.  This paper can also be recommended to those students who want 
to learn more about this experiment.  
The design of this classroom experiment is closest to Anderhub et al. (2002).  The most 
important design differences are that in Anderhub et al. (2002) agents can choose among 21 
effort levels and that the return shares are multiples of 1 percent.  Moreover, the game is played 
repeatedly, in two sequences of six periods each.  The results are that principals design work 
contracts that are incentive compatible and obey the participation constraint.  Contracts are less 
                                                 
6 Fehr and Gächter (2000) and Gächter and Fehr (2002) survey results on the economics of reciprocity and the 
relevance of fairness and reciprocity in various contracting situations.  Camerer (2003) provides an extensive   10 
unfair than predicted by standard arguments.  Agents reject unfair contracts (similarly as in the 
ultimatum game) and respond to a very large degree optimally to the incentives set by the 
contract.  Deviations from the optimal contract can be explained by reciprocity.  In summary, 
the  results  typically  observed  in  this  classroom  experiment  are  largely  consistent  with  the 
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Appendix: Instructions, decision sheets, and results sheet 
 
Design a contract! 
1.  Imagine you are the owner of a firm but you lack the expertise to run your company 
properly. Therefore you decide to hire an expert.  
2.  Your task is to design a contract between you and the expert.  
3.  The expert can accept or reject your proposal. If the expert rejects the proposal, he will 
earn 100; you will earn nothing.  
4.  If the expert accepts the contract and is therefore willing to run your company, he/she 
chooses his/her work effort. For simplicity, we assume that there are ten work effort 
levels the expert can choose (1=expert works very little; 10=expert works very hard). 
5.  The work effort determines the total return that is generated as a result of the expert’s 
work effort. The higher the expert’s work effort the higher the total return, but also the 
cost the expert has to bear. 
 
Your contract offer to the expert consists of two elements: 
1.  A fixed payment, which can be  
- positive (i.e., the expert gets a salary) 
- or negative (i.e., the expert has to pay this amount to you). 
2.  The expert’s return share, in multiples of 10%, which states the share of the total return 
(in %) that belongs to the expert (the rest automatically goes to you).  
 
Rules for contract offers to the expert: 
For contract offers the following rules hold: 
 
−700 ≤ fixed payment ≤ 700 (only integers!) 
The expert’s return share: between 0% and 100%  
(0%, 10%, 20%,…,100%) 
 
ALL combinations that obey these rules are feasible!  
 
Payoffs if the expert accepts the contract: 
The expert gets: 
[Expert’s return share in %]×(total return) + fixed payment – cost of the expert’s work effort 
 
The owner gets: 
[100% – Expert’s return share in %]×(total return) – fixed payment  
 
Note: The expert’s return share is a multiple of 10% (0% to 100%) 
Example 1: Expert’s return share = 0% ￿ the owner gets the whole return 
Example 2: Expert’s return share = 100% ￿ Expert gets the whole return 
Example 3: Expert’s return share = 50% ￿ Expert gets 50 %; the owner gets 50% of the total return 
 
Payoffs if the expert rejects the contract: 
The expert earns 100 
The owner earns 0. 
   13 
The following table indicates the relationship between the expert’s work effort and the 
generated total return from his or her work effort. The table also shows the costs of work 
effort the expert has to bear. 
 
 




Expert’s work effort 
(1=lowest; 10=highest): 
 
Total return from expert’s effort: 
70×(Work effort) 
 
Costs of work effort 
for expert 
1  70  0 
2  140  20 
3  210  40 
4  280  60 
5  350  90 
6  420  120 
7  490  160 
8  560  200 
9  630  250 






You offer the following contract: 
 
Fixed payment: +55 
Expert’s return share: 50% 
 
The expert chooses effort level 3. The total return is therefore 210. 
 
The expert earns: 50%×210 + 55 – 40 = 120. 
You earn: 50%×210 – 55 = 50.  
 
 
You can “simulate” payoff consequences of various contracts by using assumptions on the 
expert’s work effort. 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------   14 
Contract design sheet for the principal 
 
Design a contract! 
 
I make the following contract proposal to the expert: 
 
Fixed payment (between –700 and +700):          ................ 
 




Effort decision sheet for the agent 
 
 
Now you are an expert! 
 
You have just received a contract offer! You now have to make two decisions.  
 
1.  Your first decision is to decide whether you accept or reject this contract.  
 




Please fill in the details of the contract proposal that you have just received from an owner: 
The owner’s proposed fixed payment for me:        ................ 
 
The owner’s proposed return share for me:        ................ 
 






Only when “Yes”: 
 
I choose the work effort level (between 0 and 10):  .......................... 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------   15 
First results sheet (“Offered contracts and effort levels”) 
no. 
Fixed 
payment  return share %  accept (1="yes"; 0="no")  effort level 
1         
2         
...         
total         
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Second results sheet (“Optimal effort choice?”) 
Return share %  Payoff maximizing 
effort 
Actual efforts  Average effort 
0, 10, 20  1     
30, 40  4     
50  6     
60, 70  8     
80, 90, 100  10     
 
 
 